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The Uruguay Round and Agriculture:
Charting a New Direction?
[T]he results of the negotiations provide a framework for the long term reform of
agricultural trade and domestic policies over the years to come. It makes a decisive
move towards the objective of increased market orientation in agricultural trade. The
rules governing agricultural trade are strengthened which will lead to improved predict-
ability and stability in importing and exporting countries alike.'
The GATT Secretariat thus described the results of the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions on agriculture. The specific results of these negotiations were an Agreement
on Agriculture, a range of concessions and commitments by the contracting parties
in relation to market access, an Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Mea-
sures, and a Ministerial Decision concerning Least-Developed and Net Food-
Importing Developing Countries. This article examines the specific results of
the negotiations, concentrating on the Agreement on Agriculture, in order to
determine whether the assessment made by the GATT Secretariat is accurate.
In order to carry out this assessment it is necessary to examine the history of
the GATT 2 as it relates to agriculture and the actual conduct of the negotiations.
Only after such an examination is it possible to assess the "success" of the latest
round of multilateral trade negotiations and to determine whether it does indeed
"chart a new direction for agriculture."-
3
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1. NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, NUR 080, Dec. 14, 1993, at 8 (GATT Secretariat, Geneva,
Switzerland).
2. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
3. GATT Focus, Dec. 1993, at 3. The Australian representative provided this description of
the outcome of the Uruguay Round negotiations.
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I. The GATT and Agriculture-Before the Uruguay Round
In any analysis of the history of the GATT as it relates to agriculture, it is
apposite to recall the conclusion of Warley on this matter:
[A]gricultural trade liberalization is an area in which the GATT has had meagre success.
However, this is not because there is anything fundamentally deficient in the GATT
as a legal document as it pertains to agriculture .... What [is] missing above all else
... [is a] willingness on the part of virtually all important member countries to allow
agriculture to be subject to the same rules and "travel the same route at the same speed"
as industrial products.
4
One may verify this conclusion by looking to the application of various GATT
articles to disputes between the contracting parties; to the attitudes of the major
contracting parties, the European Community, and the United States; and to
attempts to influence their domestic agricultural policies.
A. GATT ARTICLES
Two particular GATT articles are examined: article XI on Quantitative Restric-
tions and article XVI on Subsidies. According to the first paragraph of article
XI, quantitative restrictions on imports of any product from another contracting
party, whatever their method of operation, are not permissible. However, an
exception is contained in paragraph 2 of article XI allowing for import restrictions
necessary for the enforcement of any governmental measure that aims (a) to
restrict the marketing or production of a like domestic product; or if there is no
substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for
which the imported product can be directly substituted; or (b) to remove a tempo-
rary surplus of a like or directly substitutable product by making it available to
certain consumers either free or below current market price; or (c) to restrict
the quantities permitted to be produced of any animal production where that
production is directly dependent on the imported product, if domestic production
of that product is negligible.'
A number of constraints, such as notice of restrictions, are imposed on the
contracting party wishing to avail itself of paragraph 2 so as to avoid that para-
graph's being used for protectionist purposes.6 Article XIII, which requires that
any quantitative restrictions imposed be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner,
further constrains such use.
4. T.K. Warley, Western Trade in Agricultural Products, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1959-197 1, at 287, 352-53 (Andrew Shonfield ed., 1976).
5. GATT, supra note 2, art. XI:2(c)(i)-(iii).
6. As an example of the constraint imposed on a contracting party wishing to use article
XI:2, any restriction under paragraph 2(a) must not reduce the total of imports relative to domestic
production "as compared with the proportion which might reasonably be expected to rule between
the two in the absence of restrictions." Id.
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Although a number of disputes have involved article XI, one of the more
significant was a complaint by the United States concerning the European Commu-
nity's arrangements for the imports of certain processed fruits and vegetables. 7
These arrangements involved a minimum import price, an import licence, and
system of surety deposits for the import of tomato concentrates. The U.S. com-
plaint was that the establishment of a minimum import price violated paragraph
1 of article XI as did the other measures that restricted trade. 8 The response of the
European Community was to admit that these measures did fall within paragraph 1
of article XI, but were exempt from complaint by virtue of paragraph 2(c) of
that article. 9 However, as there was no domestic limitation on the production of
the fresh produce that would be rendered ineffective by the importation of the
processed product, the European Community appeared unlikely to succeed on
this argument. Indeed, the panel established to resolve the dispute found that the
measures complained of breached paragraph 1 and were not exempted under
paragraph 2.'o As a result, the United States had a prima facie case of nullification
or impairment of the benefits accruing to it under the GATT.
Although the dispute serves to emphasize that article XI cannot be used for
protectionist purposes, it also illustrates the lengths to which some contracting
parties will go to protect their domestic producers. These nontariff barriers were
successfully challenged, but a significant number of similar barriers escaped such
scrutiny. " Such barriers pose a significant threat to the free flow of international
trade and negotiations to eliminate this threat have been difficult. Hillman con-
cluded, before the conclusion of the Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barri-
ers to Trade, that part of this difficulty stems from the reasoning behind the
imposition of such measures.
It is essential to any GATT negotiations that all participants recognize the nature of
the disease they are trying to cure, so that too much time and energy won't be spent
dealing with symptoms. National domestic policies are the root cause of agricultural
protection and for the interference in the free flow of international trade.' 2
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, by tackling the root of the
problem, should, therefore, lead to greater progress in this area than could be
7. GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (25th Supp.) at 68 (1979) [hereafter
BISD].
8. Id. at 74-78.
9. Id. at 78-79.
10. Id. at 95-107. The panel doubted whether fresh tomatoes could be classified as a like domestic
product, and even if they could, "the intervention system for fresh tomatoes did not qualify as a
governmental measure which operated 'to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted
to be marketed or produced'." Id. at 103.
11. For a more general discussion, see JIMMYE S. HILLMAN, NON-TARIFF AGRICULTURAL
TRADE BARRIERS (1978). In relation to GATT attempts to come to terms with the problem posed
by such barriers before the Uruguay Round, see BISD, supra note 5, (20th Supp.) at 19 (1972)
(Tokyo Round Declaration on nontariff barriers); BISD, supra note 7, (26th Supp.) at 8 (1980)
(Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade).
12. HILLMAN, supra note 11, at 192.
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achieved by the extension and clarification of the Tokyo Round Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade acting on its own. 13 One final point about the above
dispute merits attention, namely that as article XI cannot be used for protectionist
purposes, the contracting parties have moved outside the discipline provided by
the GATT by imposing illegal quantitative restrictions. Such restrictions, in the
form of Voluntary Restraint Agreements or Orderly Marketing Arrangements,
constitute a clear breach of the antidiscrimination obligation of the GATT. The
proliferation of these measures, sometimes referred to as "grey area" measures,
will be subject to greater international discipline as a result of the negotiation
and conclusion of an Agreement on Safeguards in the Uruguay Round.
Article XI is capable of applying to agriculture, yet in the effort to afford
protection to domestic producers, some contracting parties have breached the
discipline imposed by this provision. The additional obligations in articles XIII
and XIX have not led to greater discipline. A similar picture emerges in relation
to the other GATT provision to be discussed-article XVI. This article, which
deals with exports of products with the assistance of subsidies, provides in para-
graph 3:
[C]ontracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies on the export of primary
products. If, however, a contracting party grants directly or indirectly any form of
subsidy which operates to increase the export of any primary product from its territory,
such subsidy shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party
having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product, account
being taken of the shares of the contracting parties in such trade in the product during
a previous representative period, and any special factors which may have affected or
may be affecting such trade in the product.4
This particular paragraph gives rise to a significant number of problems, partic-
ularly in relation to the definition of the terms used. 5 Moreover, to be successful
any complainant will have to show the existence of a causal connection between
the grant of the subsidy and the acquisition of more than an equitable share of
world trade. Given these difficulties, an effort was made during the Tokyo Round
to deal with the definitional problems inherent in article XVI:3 in the Code on
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. Article 10(2) defined "equitable share"
as including "any case in which the effect of an export subsidy. . . is to displace
the exports of another signatory bearing in mind developments on world mar-
kets." 6
13. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade extends and clarifies the
Tokyo Round Agreement in this area, in particular by making the disciplines of the Code more
precise.
14. GATT, supra note 2, art. XVI:3.
15. For example, what is "more than an equitable share of world export trade"? See BISD,
supra note 7, (7th Supp.) at 46 (1959), for a discussion of this point in the context of an Australian
complaint about French exports of wheat flour.
16. Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties art. 10(2), BISD, supra note 7, (26th Supp.)
56, at 69 (1980).
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The conclusions of the panel reports into the complaints made by Australia
and Brazil about export refunds on sugar granted by the European Community
illustrate the fact that this additional definition did not remedy the problems of
article XVI:3. 17 The panels could not conclude that the European Community
had acquired more than an equitable share of world trade and, even if they could
have, they would have struggled to demonstrate a causal connection between the
increase in exports by the European Community and the decline in exports of
the complainants. 8 All that the panels could conclude was that the system operated
by the European Community had depressed world sugar prices, indirectly causing
prejudice to Australian and Brazilian interests.' 9 One further example illustrates
the true nature of the problem in this area. The complaint by the United States
concerning subsidies granted by the European Community to the export of wheat
flour led to the first panel being established under the Code on Subsidies. 0 The
panel report was as inconclusive as earlier reports in this area,2 but the content
of the report is not the major problem here. Rather, under the Code on Subsidies
panel reports must be considered as soon as possible so that recommendations
can be made to resolve the dispute. Despite the fact that the panel report was
made public in 1983, no action has yet been taken. The lack of respect so evident
in the bypassing of articles XI and XIX through the use of "grey area" measures
can also be found in the area of export subsidies.
However, there is a difference between the two provisions. In its discussion
of the concept of more than an equitable share, the Leutwiler report stated:
We believe this concept is economically misconceived, since it impliedly endorses
market-sharing. It is also too vague and subjective to permit clear judgment on whether
a subsidy is acceptable or not-as was shown by the result of a US complaint to the
GATT about European exports of subsidized flour. A better test of legitimacy than
that of equitable share is needed for subsidies on primary products.22
The contracting parties did not take the opportunity afforded by the Tokyo
Round to define a "better test of legitimacy." Part of the reason for the missed
opportunity is the attitude of the major contracting parties toward the GATT's
attempts to influence the direction of their domestic agricultural policies.
17. BISD, supra note 7, (26th Supp.) at 290 (1980) (Australian complaint); BISD, supra note
7, (27th Supp.) at 69 (1981) (Brazilian complaint). As the findings of both panels are identical,
further references relate only to the Australian complaint.
18. BISD, supra note 7, (26th Supp.) at 318 (1980).
19. Id. at 319. For a discussion of the aftermath of the complaint, see JOSEPH MCMAHON,
AGRICULTURAL TRADE, PROTECTIONISM AND THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT: A LEGAL PERSPEC-
TIVE 217-18 (1992).
20. The Australian and Brazilian complaints related to a period before the negotiation of the
Code on Subsidies, but both Panels used the definitions that eventually made their way into the Code.
21. BISD, supra note 7, (29th Supp.) (1983); BISD, supra note 7, (31st Supp.) at 259 (1985).
For further discussion, see Massimo Coccia, Settlement of Disputes under the Subsidies Code: Two
Panel Reports on E.E.C. Export Subsidies, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 17 (1986).
22. GATT, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE 40 (1985).
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B. THE ATTITUDES OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES
Warley identified the attitudes of the contracting parties as the primary factor
for the meagre success of the GATT in relation to agriculture. The attitude of
the two major contracting parties, the United States and the European Community,
will help to illustrate the nature of the problem that confronted the GATT before
the Uruguay Round and the magnitude of the agreement reached during that
round.
The insertion of article XI in the GATT was an important victory for the United
States as it legalized the retention of section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1933. The amendment of that Act in 1951 and its use against the import
of dairy products placed the United States in breach of its GATT obligations.
The United States, in an effort to ameliorate this situation, requested a waiver
from its GATT obligations.23 Despite attempts to restrict the scope of the waiver,
the United States succeeded in getting an effective carte blanche to adopt the
measures necessary to eliminate the causes of the situation that motivated the
request for the waiver. 4 The only requirements imposed on the United States
were that it remove the restrictions as soon as the circumstances allowed for it
and that it report on the operation of the waiver.25 By granting a waiver to the
most important contracting party, at that time, the GATT did not help create the
necessary circumstances to ensure the application of the rules of the GATT to
agriculture.26 The examination of the reports merely serve to underline the extent
of the damage to the GATT. 27 Although a significant factor preventing the devel-
opment of effective rules in the area of agriculture, it has not been the sole factor.
The attitude of the European Community to the GATT is another important factor.
The contracting parties to the GATT had an opportunity to influence the nature
of the agricultural policy to be adopted by the European Community when the
Treaty of Rome was notified to the GATT. The working party established to exam-
ine the compatibility of the Treaty of Rome with the GATT divided its work into
four subgroups, one of which dealt with the agricultural provisions of the Treaty
23. BISD, supra note 7, (3rd Supp.) at 32 (1955).
24. Id. at 141.
25. Id. at 34.
26. See Warley, supra note 4, at 347, who comments:
At a time when other exporters were highly agitated about agricultural trade restric-
tions, the architect of the trading system and the custodian of liberalism was itself
giving primacy to national interests and demanding sanction for the use of a barrier
which the agreement had set out to control and eliminate, namely quotas.
27. The 1984 review of the report noted that the waiver had:
created a situation of serious imbalance in rights and obligations under the General
Agreement. The inequity of this situation was even more serious because if other
contracting parties applied restrictions on imports, they could always be challenged
under Article XXIII proceedings which, while applicable, were not practicable with
regards to restrictions applied by the United States under the waiver.
BISD, supra note 7, (30th Supp.) at 222 (1984).
VOL. 29, NO. 2
AGRICULTURE 417
of Rome.28 The discussion within this subgroup focused on article XXIV:5(a),
which, in essence, provides that the duties imposed at the beginning of a customs
union should not be higher or more restrictive than those applied before the forma-
tion of the customs union. What concerned the subgroup was that the Treaty provi-
sions on agriculture did not indicate how these articles would be applied. The sub-
group reached no firm conclusions, but it did note that "The particular measures
envisaged under the Treaty carried a strong presumption of increased external bar-
riers and a substitution of new internal barriers in place of existing tariffs and other
measures. '29
Having failed to influence the implementation of the agricultural policy of the
European Community during the discussions in the working group, an indirect
attempt was made to influence the development of that policy through the presenta-
tion of the Harberler Report. The mandate of the panel of experts included a
request to examine the medium-term prospects for international trade in agricul-
tural products. 30 It recommended a gradual moderation of agricultural protection-
ism through a shift away from price-support policies towards a system of defi-
ciency payments. 3' Instead of following the recommendations of the Harberler
Report, the European Community based its agricultural policy on price support
and external protection. As a result, a very protectionist policy emerged, and the
European Community has consistently refused to acknowledge the protectionist
effects of aspects of its agricultural policy.
32
The above review of the GATT articles and of the attitudes of the United States
and the European Community towards the GATT reveal that the political will
to allow agricultural trade liberalization to follow the same route as industrial
trade has consistently been absent in the history of the GATT. Efforts to redress
this problem in previous rounds of multilateral trade negotiations have failed,
but the fourfold agreement reached on agriculture in the Uruguay Round promises
that the future will be distinctly different from the past.
II. The Uruguay Round Negotiations
In relation to agriculture the Uruguay Round Declaration stated:
Contracting parties agree that there is an urgent need to bring more discipline and
predictability to world agricultural trade by correcting and preventing restrictions and
distortions . . .so as to reduce the uncertainty, imbalances and instability in world
agricultural markets.
Negotiations shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and
bring all measures affecting import access and export competition under strengthened
28. BISD, supra note 7, (6th Supp.) at 71 (1958).
29. Id. at 88.
30. GATT, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1 (1958).
31. Id. at 102.
32. See, for example, the attitude of the European Community towards the protectionist effects
of the variable levy system. BISD, supra note 7, (30th Supp.) at 187 (1984).
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and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines, taking into account the
general principles governing the negotiations, by:
(i) improving market access through, inter alia, the reduction of import barriers;
(ii) improving the competitive environment by increasing discipline on the use of all
direct and indirect subsidies and other measures affecting directly or indirectly
agricultural trade, including the phased reduction of their negative effects and
dealing with their causes;
(iii) minimizing the adverse effects that sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and
barriers can have on trade in agriculture, taking into account the relevant interna-
33tional agreements.
The Declaration is considerably more specific than the references to agriculture
in either of the two previous rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, the Kennedy
Round, 34 and the Tokyo Round.35 One factor which ensured that the more positive
declaration would actually lead to meaningful results was the ending of the duop-
oly that had characterized the previous rounds of negotiations. The emergence
of the Cairns Group, made up of a group of thirteen developed and developing
countries for whom agricultural trade was economically significant,36 meant that
the United States and the European Community would no longer totally dominate
the negotiations.
The initial negotiating position of the Cairns Group provided for the establish-
ment of a long-term framework that would go as far as possible towards the
elimination of all export subsidies and import barriers. This long-term framework
would be supported by either new or amended GATT rules and would be initiated
by specific early relief measures-the so-called early harvest.37 This initial negoti-
ating position mirrored that of the United States, which called for the complete
elimination over a ten-year period of all agricultural subsidies that affected interna-
tional trade.3 These negotiating positions, which sought to promote efficiency
in the world market and to benefit efficient producers, were not well received
by the European Community. Their negotiating position was that the negotiations
should fall into two stages.39 In the first stage, emergency measures would be
taken to ease the strains in certain markets. These measures would take the form
of international annual undertakings to ensure a more efficient functioning of
33. BISD, supra note 7, (33rd Supp.) at 24 (1987).
34. BISD, supra note 7, (12th Supp.) at 36 (1964). This declaration merely listed as one of the
objectives for the negotiations the need to provide for "acceptable conditions of access to world
markets for agricultural products." Id. at 48.
35. BISD, supra note 7, (20th Supp.) at 19 (1974). The aim of the negotiations in this round
was even more general than that of the Kennedy Round; it provided for "an approach to negotiations
which, while in line with the general objectives of the negotiations, should take account of the special
characteristics and problems in this sector." Id. at 21.
36. The thirteen countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Hungary,
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay.
37. OECD, AGRICULTURAL POLICIES, MARKETS AND TRADE: MONITORING AND OUTLOOK 94
(1988).
38. Id. at 93.
39. EC BACKGROUND, No. 87/5, Annex 11 (1987).
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certain markets (cereals, sugar, and milk products) and measures to prevent the
exacerbation of existing market imbalances. In the second stage, the negotiating
position of the European Community envisaged a concerted reduction in the level
of market support and external protection. Over the longer term, these reductions
would form the basis of further negotiations aimed at binding the levels of govern-
ment support for agriculture.
The reconciliation of these divergent negotiating positions would not prove to
be an easy process, and by the mid-term review of the round in Montreal in
December 1988, it had not proved possible to achieve a reconciliation. A new
deadline of April 1989 was set, and at this time the contracting parties were able
to reach agreement on a framework for future negotiations. This framework
incorporated interrelated long- and short-term elements. The short-term element
provided for a freeze on the existing levels of domestic and export support and
protection through the adoption of specific policy measures or through the use
of the concept of the aggregate measurement of support. Over the longer term
the objective was the establishment of a fair and market-oriented agricultural
trading system. The initial means to achieve this long-term objective was the
negotiation of commitments on the support and protection of agricultural produc-
ers and the formulation of strengthened and more operationally effective GATT
rules. These new rules would cover all measures, both direct and indirect, that
affected import access and export competition; the harmonization of sanitary and
phytosanitary regulations was also advocated over the longer term. The end
product was to be "a substantial progressive reduction in agricultural support
and protection sustained over an agreed period of time."' The question left
unresolved at this stage was the precise method for the elimination of agricultural
support and protection. Differences would emerge on this issue as the contracting
parties refined their initial negotiating positions.
The negotiating position of the Cairns Group considered that ten years was
sufficient to effect the necessary reforms.42 Internal support measures were to
be grouped into three categories. The first category was prohibited measures,
which included measures that were not permitted by the GATT, such as variable
levies, and measures that allowed for exceptional treatment, such as the U.S.
waiver. The second and third categories were those measures that would be
permitted subject to discipline or according to prescribed criteria. These measures
would include direct income support not linked to the level of production. The
aggregate measurement of support would be used to implement the obligation to
eliminate trade distorting policies. To complete the process, all nontariff barriers
would be converted into tariffs and be progressively reduced-a process referred
to as tariffication. Some advantages of the tariffication are that tariffs are the
40. GATT Focus No. 61, May 1989, at 5.
41. Id. para. 6.
42. GATT Focus No. 68, Feb. 1990, at 5-6.
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least trade-distortive import barriers, would help stabilize world market prices
at a predictable level, and would generate revenue. However, the most significant
advantage is that it would be easier to negotiate the reduction of tariff barriers
than the reduction of nontariff barriers.
The United States, which made tariffication the core element of its negotiating
position, identified these advantages.43 In contrast to the position of the Cairns
Group, the United States envisaged the conversion not only of nontariff barriers,
but also of waivers and other exceptions permitting import restrictions (this latter
category included Voluntary Restraint Agreements and Orderly Marketing Ar-
rangements). All internal support policies-that is, price or income support poli-
cies linked to production-would be gradually phased out over a ten-year period.
Like the threefold classification of such measures adopted by the Cairns Group,
those internal policies not tied to production or marketing would be permitted.
As was the case with the initial negotiating positions, the attitudes of both the
Cairns Group and the United States towards the long-term objective of the reform
of agricultural trade would lead to a guaranteed process of trade liberalization
aimed at the promotion of efficiency. However, doubts were raised about the
process of tariffication, especially by the European Community. 44
The centerpiece of the negotiating position of the European Community was
not the concept of tariffication, but rather, the concept of the aggregate measure-
ment of support. According to the European Community, agricultural support
was to be calculated by measuring those elements considered as decisive in the
farmer's decision to produce-the market support price, or direct payments, or
both. The commitment to reduce support would be applied only to those products
that were currently in surplus or where serious disruptions were likely to occur.
Initial commitments would be made for a five-year period, with the possibility
of the negotiation of further commitments from the fourth year of this period.45
The position of the European Community can be contrasted with those of the
Cairns Group and the United States. Whereas the latter's negotiating positions
reflected the spirit of the mid-term review and hence the Uruguay Declaration,
the position of the European Community involved a rebalancing of support.46
43. GATT Focus No. 64, Aug./Sept. 1989, at 4.
44. GATT Focus No. 68, Feb. 1990, at 6. As an indication of the problems with the concept
of tariffication, it was not clear how nontrade concerns, such as food security, which might motivate
the imposition of nontariff barriers, could be accommodated within the concept. Equally, it is not
certain whether all nontariff barriers can be converted into tariffs and, if they can, whether they be
set at such a prohibitive level as to frustrate the process of trade liberalization.
45. GATT Focus No. 64, supra note 43, at 4.
46. The concept of the aggregate measurement of support was never well defined. The concept
appeared to be based on the premise that the then-existing imbalances in the agricultural sector
required governmental intervention on prices. As such, it failed to recognize that one of the causes
of market imbalances was governmental intervention on prices. The aggregate measurement of support
also involved establishing a fixed external reference price. The choice of reference years, therefore,
became crucial as different years would yield different results and give rise to different obligations
to reduce or rebalance the level of support.
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This position was hardly consistent with the objective of reducing support and
protection and did not bode well for the future of the negotiations.
It was obvious that a renewed impetus was necessary in order to reach a
compromise between the differing negotiating positions of the contracting parties.
Such an impetus emerged from the encouragement given by the Houston Summit
of the Group of Seven in July 1990. The Group of Seven commended the text
of the chair of the Agriculture Group, the de Zeeuw text, as the basis of intensi-
fying the negotiations.47 This text accommodated elements of all the negotiating
positions discussed above. For example, commitments to reduce internal support
measures would use the concept of the aggregate measurement of support. The
concept of tariffication was employed by de Zeeuw as a means of alleviating the
protectionist effects of border protection measures. The de Zeeuw text was later
endorsed by the Trade Negotiations Committee of the GATT at its meeting in
July 1990.48 It appeared that a way had been found to reconcile the differences
between the contracting parties and to ensure that the timetable set by the Trade
Negotiating Committee to conclude the round would be met.
Although some contracting parties met the deadline of October 15, 1990, for
the submission of their offers, others did not. It soon became obvious that the
Brussels ministerial meeting, at which it was hoped to conclude the round, would
not be successful. Attempts to reach a compromise on agriculture at this meeting
failed; the deadlock could not be broken. The Brussels Ministerial meeting
charged the chair of the Trade Negotiations Committee at the official level with
the task of pursuing consultations with the objective of "achieving agreements
in all the areas of the negotiating programme in which differences remain outstand-
ing." 49 Negotiations would be reconvened at an appropriate date in the light of
these consultations.5 ° Eventually on February 26, 1991, the Trade Negotiations
Committee at official level was able to announce the resumption of negotiations.
The contracting parties agreed to open negotiations with the objective of giving
specific commitments in the areas of domestic support, market access and export
competition. The approach that was to be adopted was that adopted by the mid-
term review in April 1989. The initial focus of the negotiations was on the
following technical issues:
In the area of domestic support: a means of determining the policies that shall be
excluded from the reduction commitment, the role and definition of an Aggregate
Measurement of Support and equivalent commitments, a means of taking account of
high levels of inflation faced by some participants, and the reinforcement of GATT
rules and disciplines.
47. GATT Focus No. 76, Nov. 1990, at 1.
48. GATT Focus No. 72, July 1990, at 12.
49. GATT Focus No. 77, Dec. 1990, at 1.
50. It is important to note that agriculture was not the only area of disagreement at the Brussels
ministerial meeting; other areas included trade-related investment measures, services and antidumping
actions.
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In the area of market access, the modality and scope of tariffication, the modalities
of a special safeguard for agriculture, the scope and modalities of implementation of
a minimum access commitment, the treatment of existing tariffs and the reinforcement
of GATT rules and disciplines.
In the area of export competition: a definition of export subsidies to be subject to
the terms of the final agreements including the development of means to avoid the
circumvention of commitments whilst maintaining adequate levels of food aid and the
reinforcement of GATT rules and disciplines.
In the area of phytosanitary measures, there is also scope for further refinement of
a number of technical provisions and procedures.
In each of these particular areas the particular concerns of developing countries, of
net food-importing developing countries, and those relating to food security will be
examined. 5'
No final date was set for the conclusion of the negotiations, although it was
hoped that the negotiations would be concluded by the end of 1991.
Although intensive work had been carried out using the framework agreed in
February 1991 leading to the emergence of major elements of the reform package,
it did not prove possible to complete the round in time for the forty-seventh
session of the contracting parties in December 1991. However, in January 1992
the Trade Negotiations Committee agreed that the Draft Final Act tabled by the
chair at the December meeting would form the basis for the completion of the
negotiations. In addition, the committee adopted a four-track work plan as the
basis for concluding the negotiations.52 Despite a promising start, the negotiations
soon lost momentum, one of the factors being a difficulty in providing agricultural
offers based on the concept of tariffication 3 Once again, a renewed impetus to
complete the round was necessary. This duly arrived in November 1992 when
at a bilateral meeting the United States and the European Community reached
an understanding on their differences with respect to agriculture.5 Having re-
solved their differences on the issues of domestic support, export subsidies and
market access, the United States and the European Community expressed the
hope that the negotiations could be concluded by the end of 1992. 5' Once again
this deadline would not be met.
During the early part of 1993 the negotiations drifted again towards stalemate.
After the Group of Seven meeting in Tokyo in July 1993 negotiations were
51. GATT Focus No. 79, Mar. 1991, at 1-2.
52. GATT Focus No. 87, Jan./Feb. 1992, at 1-2. Track one consisted of intensive, nonstop
bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral negotiations on market access. Track two consisted of intensive
nonstop negotiations, again with continuous multilateral monitoring on initial commitments in ser-
vices. Track three consisted of work to ensure the legal conformity and internal consistency of the
agreements constituting the Final Act. Track four consisted of work, at the level of the TNC, with
a view to examining whether, and if, it is possible to adjust the package in certain specific places.
53. GATT Focus No. 89, Apr. 1992, at 8.
54. GATT Focus No. 95, Nov./Dec. 1992, at 1-2.
55. Id. at 2 (joint press statement issued after Blair House meeting). The timetable set was very
optimistic as the statement referred to "detailed negotiations" on specific sectors or products in
order to achieve "a substantial and balanced package."
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relaunched.56 Referring to the outcome of this meeting, the new GATT director
general, Peter Sutherland, commented: "This has been a very positive result
which clearly signalled an intent to put the conclusion of the Uruguay Round to
the forefront of the political agenda during the coming months. The conclusion
of the Round is now an acid test of world leadership." 7 Considerable progress
was made in all areas, though in the November meeting of the Trade Negotiations
Committee it was pointed out that there were remaining problems with tariffication
and the provision for current and minimum access opportunities.58 These outstand-
ing issues were resolved; negotiations were finally completed; and the Uruguay
Round was concluded on December 15, 1993. 59
A. THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE
The Uruguay Round was formally concluded by the Marrakech Declaration
of April 15, 1994, adopted by the 124 governments and the European Community
that had participated in the negotiations. The opening words of the Declaration
state that: "Ministers salute the historic achievement represented by the conclu-
sion of the Round, which they believe will strengthen the world economy and
lead to more trade, investment, employment and income growth throughout the
world.' 6 In relation to agriculture, the Uruguay Round was a very historic
achievement. Not only will there be strengthened and more operationally effective
GATT rules, but also, there is to be an Agreement on Agriculture that will shape
the future content of the agricultural policies of the contracting parties. Indeed,
the preamble to the Agreement on Agriculture recalls the objectives set for the
negotiations by both the Uruguay Declaration and the mid-term review. What
is envisaged is the adoption of specific commitments in the areas of market access,
domestic support, and export competition. This article now addresses each of
these areas in turn.
B. MARKET ACCESS
The results of the market-access negotiations were recorded in the national
schedule of concessions annexed to the Uruguay Round Protocol that forms an
56. In part, these renegotiations were due to the trade ministers of Canada, Japan, the United
States, and the European Community who had resolved some of their outstanding differences on
the issue of market access. In relation to agriculture, the four noted: "We look forward to immediate
re-engagement of the multilateral negotiations to complete expeditiously the agricultural market access
package, including processed products, as an essential component of the agriculture agreement and
of a global and balanced Uruguay Round package." GATT Focus No. 101, Aug./Sept. 1993,
at 3.
57. Id. at 2.
58. GATT Focus No. 103, Nov. 1993, at 2; see NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra
note 1, NUR 076, Nov. 1993, at 5.
59. GATT Focus No. 104, Dec. 1993, at 1.
60. GATT Focus No. 107, May 1994, at 7.
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integral part of the Final Act. 6 In addition to the usual reductions in the levels
of tariffs reflected in appendix IA of the Uruguay Round Protocol, there are also
to be concessions on nontariff measures. These latter concessions are the result
of the adoption of the process of tariffication that applies to nearly all types of
nontariff barriers. 62 The starting point for this process is the conversion of existing
nontariff barriers into tariff barriers to provide for an equivalent level of protec-
tion. The average reduction for these tariffs over the duration of the agreement
will reflect differential levels of development within the contracting parties; for
developed contracting parties the average reduction is to be 36 percent over six
years, whereas for developing countries contracting parties the average reduction
is to be 24 percent to be implemented over a ten-year period. To reflect the
comprehensive nature of the market-access negotiations all participating con-
tracting parties are required to make minimum reductions on each tariff line. In
reflection of their low level of development, the least developed contracting
parties are not required to reduce their tariffs.
The process of tariffication also requires that existing access opportunities
be maintained and in those cases where current access falls below 3 percent
of domestic consumption, minimum access tariff quotas are to be established.
These quotas are to be expanded over the implementation period. According
to article 4:2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, "[m]embers shall not maintain,
resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind which have been required to
be converted into ordinary customs duties" except as authorized under article
5 and Annex 5. Annex 5 represents an attempt to counter concerns raised
during the negotiations relating to the tariffication of nontariff barriers on
particularly sensitive products. However, there are strict limits on the use of
this special treatment:
(a) imports of the designated products6 3 comprised less than 3 percent of corresponding
domestic consumption in "the base period";
(b) no export subsidies have been provided since the beginning of the base period for
the designated products;
61. Article 4:1 of the Agreement on Agriculture notes that "[mlarket access concessions contained
in Schedules relate to bindings and reductions of tariffs and to other market access commitments as
specified therein." Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Pt. III, Annex IA, Agreements on Trade in Goods, Agreement on Agriculture, art.
4:1 [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture].
62. According to a note to article 4:2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, the measures to be
converted include "quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import prices,
discretionary import licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through state trading enterprises,
voluntary export restraints and similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties, whether
or not the measures are maintained under country-specific derogations from the GATT 1947."
Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 61, art. 4:2 n. I. Measures which will not be converted
are limited to "measures maintained under balance-of-payments provisions or under other general,
non-agriculture-specific provisions of the GATT 1994 or of the other Multilateral Trade Agreements
in Annex IA of the MTO." Id.
63. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 7, annex 5, § A. (a).
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(c) effective production restricting measures are applied to the primary agricultural
product;
(d) such products are designated with the symbol "ST-Annex 5" in Section 1B of Part
I of a Member's Schedule annexed to the Uruguay Round (1994) Protocol as being
subject to special treatment reflecting factors of non-trade concerns, such as food security
and environmental protection; and
(e) minimum access opportunities in respect of the designated products correspond,
.. . to 4 per cent of base period domestic consumption of the designated products from
the beginning of the first year of the implementation period and, thereafter, are increased
by 0.8 per cent of corresponding domestic consumption in the base period per year
for the remainder of the implementation period. 64
The cumulative effect of these conditions indicates that there will be few exemp-
tions from the full scope of the tariffication process. Even in the situation where
the provisions of the annex can be used, minimum access opportunities will rise
from 4 percent at the beginning of the implementation period to 8 percent at the
end of the period.
Paragraph 6 of annex 5 allows a member to restrict access to a figure below
8 percent if the member decides to end the special treatment it has afforded to
the designated product.65 Should the member wish to continue affording special
treatment to the designated product, the percentage shall be the subject of negotia-
tions. These negotiations may allow for the continuation of the special treatment
on the condition that the member provides additional and acceptable concessions.
If special treatment is not continued after these negotiations, the minimum access
opportunities at the end of the implementation period are to be maintained at 8
percent. An additional exception is provided for in section B of annex 5, which
applies to "a primary agricultural product that is the predominant staple in the
traditional diet of a developing country Member. "66 This exception is a further
reflection of the special and differential treatment that the Uruguay Round has
afforded developing countries.
Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture allows for special safeguard mea-
sures to be taken with respect to tariffied products if:
64. These are defined as "any primary agricultural product and its worked and/or prepared
products." Id. § A.l.
65. Paragraph 2 of annex 5 states that if a member ceases to apply special treatment, "the
Member concerned shall maintain the minimum access opportunities already in effect at such time
and increase the minimum access opportunities by 0.4 per cent of corresponding domestic consumption
in the base period per year for the remainder of the implementation period." Agreement on Agricul-
ture, supra note 61, annex 5, § A.2. For example, if a member decides to end the special treatment
at the beginning of the fourth year, by the end of the period the minimum access opportunities will
be 7.2% (4% + 0.8% + 0.8% + 0.8% + 0.4% + 0.4%).
66. Id. annex 5, § B.7. The provisions of section B mirror those of section A. There are conditions
on the use of the exception (minimum access opportunities and appropriate market access opportunities
for other products), negotiations for the continuation of the exception, additional opportunities in
the event of successful negotiations, and the consequences of the noncontinuation of the exception.
Id. annex 5, § B.7-10.
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(i) the volume of imports of that product entering the customs territory of the Member
granting the concession during any year exceeds a trigger level67 which relates to the
existing market access opportunity ... ; or, but not concurrently:
(ii) the price at which imports of that product may enter the customs territory of
the Member granting the concession, as determined on the basis of the c.i.f. import
price of the shipment concerned expressed in terms of its domestic currency, falls
below a trigger price equal to the average 1986 to 1988 reference price for the product
concerned.6
The special safeguard measure envisaged by article 5 is the introduction of
an additional duty. A strict schedule is established in article 5:5 detailing the
amount of this additional duty, and it is only to be maintained until the end of
the year in which it is imposed. In essence what article 5 provides is a specific
safeguard measure for agriculture drafted in such a way that its application will
be transparent. 69 The use of article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards will
no longer be applicable to safeguard measures in relation to market access for
agricultural products.
If a comparison is made between the various negotiating positions of the main
contracting parties and the results of the negotiations in the area of market access,
it would appear that a landmark agreement has been reached in this area. The
adoption of the concept of tariffication was undoubtedly a success for those
who strongly advocated it, in particular the United States and the Cairns Group.
Moreover, the problems identified with the concept, such as how to recognize
nontrade concerns, for example food security, have also been rectified. While
it may be argued that the minimum access opportunities are not set at a particularly
high level, it must be remembered that the process of tariffication and the reduction
of tariffs is necessarily a long-term process. In addition, specific safeguard mea-
sures, which would frustrate the process of reform, will only be adopted on
satisfaction of very strict criteria. The products that may benefit from these
measures must be flagged from a very early stage. The measures adopted will
be temporary, and provision is made for consultation with affected contracting
parties. These criteria and the overall transparency of the process will ensure
that the process of liberalization is not derailed by such safeguard measures.
C. DOMESTIC SUPPORT
If the first part of the Agreement on Agriculture charts a new direction for
agriculture in the GATT then the second part, which relates to domestic support,
67. Id. art. 5:1(i), (ii). In addition to these conditions, the agricultural product must also be
designated in the member's schedule as being the subject of a concession in respect of which article
5 may be invoked.
68. The trigger level is defined in article 5:4 and varies according to the existing level of market
opportunities. Id. art. 5:4.
69. This safeguard is specifically provided for. See id. art. 5:7. Additional conditions imposed
on a member using this provision include the giving of notice, the provision of statistical information
and the opportunity for consultations. Id.
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truly signifies that the direction is towards a fair and market-oriented agricultural
trading system. The centerpiece of the commitments in this area is the concept
of the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS), which is defined in article
l(a) as "[the] annual level of support, expressed in monetary terms, provided
for an agricultural product in favour of the producers of the basic agricultural
product or nonproduct-specific support provided in favour of agricultural produc-
ers in general. . . ." Annex 3 to the Agreement gives detailed guidance on the
calculation of the AMS. According to the provisions of this annex, the AMS is
to be calculated on a product-specific basis for each product receiving any type
of support that is not exempt from the reduction commitment. Further guidelines
indicate that what is being attempted is the calculation of all those financial factors
that influence a farmer to produce a certain product.7 ° The reference period for
the calculation of the external reference price, which is a significant factor in
the calculation of market price support, is the period from 1986 to 1988.
Having calculated the AMS, the next step is to calculate the total AMS, as,
in line with the negotiating positions of the contracting parties, there are a number
of specific policies which need not be included within the commitment to reduce
the total AMS. Annex 2, paragraph 1, to the Agreement states:
Domestic support policies for which exemption from the reduction commitments is
claimed shall meet the fundamental requirement that they have no, or at most minimal,
trade distortion effects or effects on production. Accordingly all policies for which
exemption is claimed shall conform to the following basic criteria:
(i) the support in question shall be provided through a publicly-funded government
programme (including government revenue foregone) not involving transfers from con-
sumers; and,
(ii) the support in question shall not have the effect of providing price support to
producers....
The annex goes on to list twelve specific types of policies, the so-called green
box policies, that will be excluded from the reduction commitment. 7 If excluded,
it is up to the member to ensure that such policies remain consistent with the
requirements of annex 2; in the event that they do not, they will be included in
future calculations of the total AMS.72 Further exclusions from the commitment
70. For example, the following factors are listed in annex 3: subsidies will include both budgetary
outlays and revenue forgone by governments or their agents; specific agricultural levies or fees paid
by producers are to be deducted from the AMS; the AMS will be calculated as close as practicable
to the point of first sale of the product concerned. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 61, pt.
III, annex 3, §§ 2, 4, 7.
71. The twelve categories are: general services (for example research); public stockholding for
food security purposes; domestic food aid; direct payments to producers; decoupled income support;
government financial participation in income insurance and income safety-net programs; payments
for relief from natural disasters; structural adjustment assistance provided through producer retirement
programs; structural adjustment provided through resource retirement programs; structural adjust-
ment assistance provided through investment aids; payments under environmental programs; and
payments under regional assistance programs. Id. annex 2, §§ 2-13.
72. Id. art. 7:2(a).
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can be found in articles 6:4 (de minimis provision)7 3 and 6:5 (direct payments
under production limiting programs).74 In a related article, domestic support
measures that fully conform to the provisions of annex 2 are nonactionable for
the purposes of countervailing duties, exempt from actions based on article XVI
of the GATT and part III of the Subsidies Agreement, and exempt from actions
based on article II of the GATT. A similar exception is provided in article 13:2
for those domestic support measures that have been exempted under articles
6:4 and 6:5. Any consultations or disputes about these provisions are to be settled
using the new dispute-settlement procedure.75
The commitment of the members of the Agreement is to reduce the product-
specific and non-product-specific support that does not qualify for exemption by
20 percent during the implementation period. A member will comply with the
reduction commitment when in a particular year the level of domestic support
provided to agricultural producers does not exceed the commitment specified in
that member's schedule. Reflecting the differential treatment accorded to devel-
oping countries, the reduction commitment is set at 13.3 percent with no reduction
being necessary for the least developed countries.7 Developing countries also
benefit in that investment subsidies and other agricultural input subsidies forming
part of agricultural and rural development policies will be excluded from the
calculation of the total AMS.
The significance of the reduction commitments of the members to the
Agreement on Agriculture with respect to domestic support measures is that the
first step has been taken towards the creation of a more competitive environment
in agriculture. In contrast with the position initially adopted by the European
Community, the concept of the AMS will not be used to provide for a rebalancing
of support between products. The exclusion of certain categories of policies
differs from the negotiating position of both the Cairns Group and the United
States in that there are only two categories of policies. However, the rationale
for the exclusion of certain policies will ensure no negative impact on trade
liberalization. Moreover, the reduction in the level of domestic support will, in
some contracting parties, lead to a reduction in the level of overproduction and
73. The de minimis provision allows a member to disregard domestic support that is either
product-specific or non-product-specific where that support does not exceed a certain percentage of
the value of total agricultural production. Id. art. 6:4(a). For developed country members that percent-
age is 5%, whereas it is 10% for developing country members. Id. art. 6:4(b).
74. This exception only applies if the payments are based on fixed areas and yields or are made
on 85 % or less of the base level of production or, if related to livestock, are made on a fixed number
of head. Id. art. 6:5(a).
75. Id. art. 19.
76. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, PART II, ANNEX 1 A, AGREEMENTS ON
TRADE IN GOODS, 2 URUGUAY ROUND PROTOCOL TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE 1994, app. V, pt. IV, § I [hereinafter Uruguay Protocol].
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consequently fewer exports of surplus production. This reduction in exports will
further increase the stability of international agricultural markets.
D. EXPORT SUBSIDIES
Whereas the approach to domestic support is to outline those measures to be
exempt from the reduction commitment, in relation to export subsidies the ap-
proach is to list those export subsidies subject to reduction commitments. Six
specific examples are listed in article 9:1. As examples these include:
(a) The provision by governments or their agencies of direct subsidies, including
payments-in-kind, to a firm, to an industry, to producers of an agricultural product,
to a co-operative or other association of such producers, or to a marketing board,
contingent on export performance.
(b) The sale or disposal for export by governments or their agencies of non-
commercial stocks of agricultural products at a price lower than the comparable price
charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market.77
These and the other examples relate mainly to the provision of direct export
subsidies.
The export subsidy commitments undertaken by the members of the agreement
may relate to budgetary outlay and export quantity. 78 For developed country
members the commitment is to reduce the budgetary outlays of the export subsidies
and the quantities benefiting from such subsidies, over the implementation period
covered to a level 36 percent and 21 percent below the levels in the 1986-1990
base period. Provision is made in article 9:2(b) for members to grant export
subsidies in excess of the corresponding annual commitment levels provided that
certain conditions are satisfied. 79 To respect the principle of differential treatment
for developing countries, the equivalent percentage reductions are to 24 percent
and 14 percent over a ten-year period. As in other commitments under the
Agreement, the least developed country members are not required to undertake
reduction commitments. Additional differential treatment is provided for these
countries as a number of prohibited export subsidies are exempt from the reduction
commitment provided that such subsidies are not applied in a manner that would
circumvent the reduction commitment. 80
77. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 61, art. 9:1.
78. Uruguay Protocol, supra note 76, app. V, pt. IV, § II.
79. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 61, art. 9:2(b). The conditions seek to ensure compli-
ance with the reduction commitments allowing for an annual excess of up to 3 % of the base period
budgetary outlays and 1.75% of the base period quantities. The potential effect on the reduction
process is limited by article 9:2(b)(iii), which states: "[T]he total cumulative amounts of budgetary
outlays for such export subsidies and the quantities benefiting from such export subsidies over the entire
implementation period are no greater than the totals that would have resulted from full compliance with
the relevant annual commitment levels specified in the Member's Schedule." Id.
80. Id. art. 9:4. The specific export subsidies exempted are: the provision of subsidies to reduce
the costs of marketing exports of agricultural products including handling, upgrading and other
processing costs, and the costs of international transport and freight; and internal transport and freight
charges on export shipments, provided or mandated by governments, on terms more favorable than
for domestic shipments. Id. art. 9: 1(d), (e).
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For those export subsidies that conform to the provisions of the Agreement
there will be an exemption from actions based on article XVI of the GATT or
articles 3, 5, and 6 of the Subsidies Agreement. Those export subsidies not
covered by article 9:1 are not to be applied in a manner that results, or may
result, in the "circumvention of the export subsidy commitments. "" These non-
listed export subsidies will be subject to the Subsidies Agreement, which estab-
lishes three categories of subsidies: prohibited, 2 actionable, 3 and nonaction-
able. 84 In addition, article 13:3(a) of the Agreement on Agriculture makes clear
that subsidies covered by article 9:1 can continue to be subject to countervailing
duties in limited circumstances. Article VI of the GATT and part V of the Subsidies
Agreement may be invoked "upon a determination of injury or threat thereof
based on volume, effect on prices, or consequent impact." 85 Finally, the obliga-
tion not to circumvent the reduction commitments also applies to noncommercial
transactions. Article 10:4 states that members that donate international food aid
must ensure:
(a) that the provision of international food aid is not tied directly or indirectly to
commercial exports of agricultural products to recipient countries;
(b) that international food aid transactions, including bilateral food aid which is
monetised, shall be carried out in accordance with the FAO "Principles of Surplus
Disposal and Consultative Obligations" including, where appropriate, the system of
Usual Marketing Requirements; and
(c) that such aid shall be provided to the extent possible in fully grant forms or on
terms no less concessional than those provided for in article IV of the Food Aid Conven-
tion 1986.
The reduction commitments on both budgetary outlay on export subsidies and
limits on the quantities that can benefit from such subsidies complete the charting
of a new direction for agriculture. The call for the elimination of all export
subsidies, for example in the negotiating position of the United States and the
Cairns Group, has not been met. Export subsidies will continue to play a role
in international agricultural trade; total elimination remains a long-term goal.
Export subsidies will be subject to the discipline provided for in the Agreement
81. Id. art. 10:1. It can be assumed that article 19 on consultation and dispute settlement will
be applicable in this case.
82. Id. art. 3. These subsidies are subject to a new dispute settlement procedure outlined in
article 4, the main feature of which is an expedited timetable for action by the Dispute Settlement
Body. Id. art. 4. Countermeasures will be authorized if the prohibited subsidy is not withdrawn
within a specified period.
83. Id. art. 5 passim. These provide that such subsidies shall not have adverse impact on the
interests of other signatories. Id. An adverse impact is defined as injury to a domestic industry,
nullification or impairment of direct or indirect benefits arising under the GATT, or serious prejudice
to the interests of another signatory. If the dispute settlement body determines that an adverse impact
exists, the subsidy must be either withdrawn or the adverse effects removed. Id.
84. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 61, art. 8 passim. If serious adverse effects to a
domestic industry of a member arise from these subsidies, that member may seek a determination
and recommendation from the committee. Id.
85. Id. art. 13:3(a).
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in Agriculture; subsidies falling outside this discipline will be subject to the
discipline provided by the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties.
One must remember that the commitment to reduce the level of export subsidies
forms part of a package of measures for the reform of international trade in
agricultural products. As noted above, the commitments on domestic support will
lead to reduced production and, consequently, the level of production available for
export. An assessment of the results of the Uruguay Round negotiations must,
therefore, look at the overall package rather than attempt to criticize aspects of
that package. This approach must also be the case for agriculture.
E. OTHER ISSUES
To complete the package on agriculture a number of other issues should be
noted. The first of these issues is noted in article 14 of the Agreement on Agricul-
ture, which urges the members to give effect to the Agreement on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures, that is measures considered "necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health." 86 The negotiation of such an agreement
formed part of the Uruguay Round Declaration on Agriculture and the mid-term
review of the Round viewed harmonisation of regulations in this area as a long-
term objective.
The Agreement eventually concluded confirms that members have the right
to adopt these measures subject to the requirement that "they are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion between Members where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction
on international trade." 87 The members agree to "harmonize sanitary and phtyo-
sanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible . . .[using] international stan-
dards, guidelines and recommendations." 88 Under paragraph 11 of the Agreement
the members are allowed to introduce higher standards if scientific justification
exists for such measures or as a result of an assessment of risk using mechanisms
developed by the relevant international organizations. 89 In addition to the obliga-
tion to harmonize international standards, the Agreement also endorses the princi-
ple of equivalence:
86. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 61, pt. II, annex IA (defining sanitary or phytosanitary
measures).
87. Id; see also id. §§ 5-8 (relating to the basic rights and obligations of the members).
88. Id. § 9. Section 12 of the Agreement states:
Members shall play a full part within the limits of their resources in the relevant
international organizations and their subsidiary bodies . . ., and in international and
regional organizations operating within the framework of the International Plant Protec-
tion Convention, to promote within these organizations the development and periodic
review of standards, guidelines and recommendations with respect to all aspects of
sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
89. Id. § 19. This latter ground for adopting higher standards is further developed in paragraphs
16 to 23 of the Agreement.
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Members shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other Members as
equivalent, even if these measures differ from their own or from those used by other
Members trading in the same product, if the exporting Member objectively demonstrates
to the importing Member that its measures achieve the importing Member's appropriate
level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection. 90
Provision exists for inspection, testing, and other relevant procedures. In addition,
all members undertake to ensure the transparency of all measures adopted. In
the event of disputes over the implementation of the Agreement, the WTO Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes will
apply.
The Agreement also provides for special and differential treatment for devel-
oping countries, for example, in the form of longer time frames for compliance
when new measures are introduced. 9' Throughout the Agreements special and
differential treatment is accorded to developing countries and even more favour-
able treatment to the least-developed countries.92 The special treatment accorded
to the least-developed countries is further enhanced by the decision on measures
concerning the possible negative effects of the reform program on least-developed
and net food-importing developing countries. The decision recognizes that the
implementation of the reform package in agriculture may have negative effects
on these countries in relation to the supply of food imports on reasonable terms
and conditions. These negative effects may be ameliorated through the provision
of food aid, aid for agricultural development, and the possibility of assistance from
the IMF and World Bank. The Committee on Agriculture, which is established by
article 17 of the Agreement on Agriculture, is responsible for monitoring the
follow up to this decision. 93
The final issue to be noted relates to the review of the commitments under-
taken and the future of the reform process. According to article 18, the Commit-
tee on Agriculture will review the progress in the implementation of the com-
mitments undertaken. The review process is to be undertaken on the basis of
notification submitted by Members and any documentation requested by the
WTO. Within this process members will have an opportunitiy to raise matters
relevant to the implementation of the the reform program. The outcome of
these reviews will undoubtedly form part of the continuation of the reform
process. As article 20 notes: "Recognizing that the long-term objective of
substantial progressive reductions in support and protection resulting in funda-
mental reform is an ongoing process, Members agree that negotiations for
continuing the process will be initiated one year before the end of the implemen-
tation period .... " The negotiations will consider the experience and effects
of the reduction commitments, nontrade concerns, and special and differential
90. Id. § 15.
91. For further details, see id. §§ 31-34.
92. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 61, art. 15.
93. Id. arts 16:2, 17.
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treatment accorded to developing countries. Other factors to be included in
these negotiations involve a consideration of what further commitments are
necessary to achieve the long-term objective of establishing a fair and market-
oriented agricultural trading system. The Agreement on Agriculture is the
start of the process of reform, and article 20 makes clear that this Agreement
is merely the first step in a long-term process.
F. CONCLUSION
Rangarajan concluded:
Political will is not only a hazy and vague concept but it is an example of circular
reasoning. All that is said is that an agreement was not concluded because it could not
be concluded; it did not work because it could not work. The shorthand expression
"lack of political will" hides a multitude of factors, which together determine why a
solution, even if it is economically viable, cannot be politically implemented. Negotia-
tions rarely fail because appropriate economic solutions are not available. Failures are
either because the economic solutions are considered politically unfeasible or because
the acceptable solutions are rendered obsolete by changing circumstances.
94
The exclusion of agricultural products and policies from the discipline that
had characterized the GATT treatment of industrial products had been an act
of political will by the major contracting parties. The political will to effect a
fundamental change in the nature of the GATT as it applies to agriculture, so
clearly absent in the previous rounds of multilateral negotiations, was clearly
present during the Uruguay Round. This change was brought about because the
true cost of the agricultural policies pursued by the main contracting parties was
no longer supportable. 95 The Agreement on Agriculture is the beginning of an
adjustment process for the agricultural policies of the contracting parties, which
is in essence an attempt to reduce the cost of domestic agricultural policies and
their protectionist effects.
A legal framework has been provided for the long-term reform of agricul-
tural trade and the domestic policies of the contracting parties. As article 20
of the Agreement on Agriculture makes clear, reform is to be an ongoing
process. The GATT, and the new WTO, must ensure that there will be a
continuing political will to continue this reform process. This will involve
demonstrating the benefits of the Agreement on Agriculture to consumers and
producers, and to both developed and developing countries. As the director-
general of the GATT commented:
The Uruguay Round will lead to a substantial improvement in the sustainability of
agricultural markets. A broader market resulting from gradual improvements in access,
along with stricter rules on trade, should lead to a more predictable environment for
investment decisions in which all elements of the agri-food economy can thrive. Farmers
94. L.N. RANGARAJAN, COMMODITY CONFLICT 48 (1978).
95. See OECD, AGRICULTURAL POLICIES, MARKETS AND TRADE (1988).
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should be able to develop a longer term view of their business prospects than has been
the case in recent years. They should again be in a position to supply goods that the
market needs rather than witness the tragic waste of producing stockpiles. Processors
will be able to plan ahead with more certainty and with greater efficiency through the
reduction of the implicit tax on primary inputs. Less volatile markets will enable export-
ers and importers to increase business opportunities at lower levels of risk. 96
If this conclusion is validated by the experience over the next few years, then
indeed a new direction has been charted for agriculture in the GATT, and the
political will that led to the conclusion of the Agreement on Agriculture will
ensure the continuation of the reform process.
96. Uruguay Round to Bring New Opportunities, Independence and Sustainable Markets to Farm-
ers, NEWS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 1, NUR 065, Sept. 1993, at 9.
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